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In this year of celebration of the federal Constitution's 200th
anniversary, we appropriately also focus attention on the New
York Constitution, adopted ten years earlier. Given that we have
both a state and federal Constitution, a state and federal Bill of
Rights, and state and federal courts that are sworn to uphold
them, the relation and accommodation between the two is natu-
rally a subject of interest.
Of particular concern are provisions that are parallel if not
identical in both constitutions, including, for example, such signifi-
cant protections of the Bill of Rights as the right of free speech;
the right to counsel, due process and equal protection of the law;
and the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Should state courts decide such common issues on a state or fed-
eral basis? Should they read their own constitutions to provide
greater protection than found under the equivalent provisions of
the federal charter, or should they simply conform to federal
precedents? I would like to explore these questions both as a mat-
ter of history and as a matter of theory.
I
Much has been written on the recent emergence of state con-
stitutional law.1 The literature indicates that, more often now,
t Reprinted with the permission of The Record of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York 42, April 1987, 3. The text of this Article was, in substance, delivered as
the Forty-First Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture at the House of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York on February 26, 1987.
* Associate Judge, New York Court of Appeals.
See, e.g., Bamberger, Methodology for Raising State Constitutional Issues, in PRAC-
TISING LAW INSTITUTE, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 287-306 (P.S.
Bamberger chairperson) (Litigation Course Handbook Series No. 277 1985) [hereinafter
Bamberger, Methodology]; DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMS-
BURG CONFERENCE (B.D. McGraw ed. 1985) [hereinafter WMLIAMS3URG CONFERENCE]; Bren-
nan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 538 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Bill of Rights]; Bren-
nan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489
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state courts are deciding that standards set by the United States
Supreme Court under the federal Constitution do not satisfy the
more rigorous requirements of similar provisions of state constitu-
tions, as to which state courts are in general the final arbiters.2
Some describe this as a new judicial federalism; others, more pejo-
ratively, as an unprincipled reaction to particular criminal law de-
cisions and perceived directions of the Supreme Court.
History tells us that, whether in civil or criminal matters, the
independent protection of individual rights under state constitu-
tions is not new; nor is it an illegitimate assumption of authority
by state courts. Ironically, in this bicentennial year, the emergence
of state constitutional law is in many respects a return to a philos-
ophy of federalism similar-although admittedly not identical-to
that of the framers.
When the framers gathered in Philadelphia, each of the Colo-
nies already had adopted a constitution setting out the fundamen-
tal terms by which it was to be governed. In New York, our Consti-
tution, drawn up under the stress of war and revolution, was
adopted on April 20, 1777.
The state charters for many years were the sole protection
against governmental overreaching. Indeed, when the federal Con-
stitution was first drawn up, a Bill of Rights was viewed as unnec-
essary, in part because state constitutions already safeguarded the
rights of citizens. And when the Bill of Rights was later added, it
was taken from and actually mirrored corresponding state enact-
ments.3 Despite this deliberate duplication, there was no thought
(1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions]; Collins, State Constitional Law, Nat'l
L.J., Supp., Sept. 29, 1986; Collins & Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review:
1985 Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317
(1986) [hereinafter Collins & Galie, Judicial Review]; Collins, Galie & Kincaid, State High
Courts, State Constitutions and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Sur-
vey, 16 PUBLIUS 141 (1986); Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454
(1970) [hereinafter Countryman, State Bill]; Symposium: The Emergence of State Consti-
tutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REV. 959 (1985); Note, Developments in the Law-The Interpreta-
tion of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982).
2 State court decisions interpreting the federal Constitution are subject to review by the
United States Supreme Court. However, state court decisions-or for that matter, federal
court decisions-interpreting state constitutions are subject to Supreme Court review only
for federal law violations. See Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common
Law Tradition (Book Review), 84 MICH. L. REv. 583, 588 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE (1985)).
3B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 199, 286, 383, 1204
(1971); Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1, at 501; see also Peters, Remarks at the
Annual Second Circuit Judicial Conference, 115 F.R.D. 405, 406-09 (1986) [hereinafter Pe-
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that state constitutions were thereby superseded or their Bills of
Rights rendered redundant. To the contrary, the contemplation
was that the states would remain the principal protectors of indi-
vidual rights-"the immediate and visible guardian of life and
property"4-with the powers of the national government princi-
pally directed to external objects such as war, peace and foreign
commerce.5
The framers designed a system of dual federalism-that the
federal government and the states constituted separate sovereign-
ties, each supreme within its sphere. For the first century of our
history, the federal Bill of Rights was a protection solely in relation
to federal authorities; state constitutions protected the People
from abuse by state authorities.6 Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,7
decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1833, exemplifies
this design. By a series of ordinances, the City of Baltimore had
redirected the course of several streams so that they ran into a
harbor near a wharf owned by Barron. Barron proved to the satis-
faction of the trial court that the soil and debris carried down by
the streams made the harbor so shallow that his pier became
unusable. After losing before a Maryland court of appeals, Barron
appealed to the United States Sdpreme Court, arguing that the
City of Baltimore had taken his property without just compensa-
tion in violation of the fifth amendment. In a unanimous decision
written by Chief Justice Marshall, himself a great federalist, the
Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. The fifth
amendment-and by analogy, the entire Bill of Rights-in Chief
Justice Marshall's words, "is intended solely as a limitation on the
exercise of power by the government of the United States, and is
not applicable to the legislation of the states."8 As the Court wrote:
ters, Remarks]; Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 275 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report].
4 THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 107 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
1 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (J. Madison); see also Mosk, State Constitu-
tionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1081, 1082 (1985) [hereinafter
Mask, Liberal and Conservative].
6 Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 738-39 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Baker,
The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism
Along a Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 824 (1985) [hereinafter Baker, State Ground];
Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relation-
ship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L. REV. 977, 978 (1985) [hereinafter Pol-
lock, State and Federal Courts].
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
Id. at 250-51.
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Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that con-
stitution, provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers
of its particular government, as its judgment dictated....
... In their several constitutions [the states] have imposed
such restrictions on their respective governments as their own
wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most proper for them-
selves. It is a subject on which they judge exclusively .... 
The state courts, by the same token, understood that they
were the arbiters of their own constitutions. In New York, as early
as 1856, in Wynehamer v. People,10 the New York Court of Ap-
peals struck down a statute as violative of the due process clause of
the State Constitution. That case involved an 1855 "Act for the
prevention of intemperance, pauperism and crime," which made
unlawful the possession and sale of "intoxicating liquors." The
court found that the Act constituted a deprivation of property
without due process of law, stating:
[The court is] not insensible to the delicacy and importance of
the duty [it assumes] in overruling an act of the legislature, be-
lieved by so many intelligent and good men to afford the best
remedy for great and admitted evils in society; but we cannot for-
get that the highest function intrusted to us is that of maintain-
ing inflexibly the fundamental law. And believing . .. that the
prohibitory act transcends the constitutional limits of the legisla-
tive power, it must be adjudged to be void.11
In the wake of the Civil War and in a spirit of nationalism, the
fourteenth amendment was adopted. Although its full reach was
not immediately manifest, the fourteenth amendment eventually
changed half of the Barron formula. After a false start in the
Slaughter-House Cases,2 the Supreme Court began repeatedly
suggesting that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment applied to and limited the exercise of power by the states.
As the federal Constitution marked its centennial, the Su-
9 Id. at 247-48.
10 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
'1 Id. at 405-06.
In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme Court nar-
rowly construed the fourteenth amendment's "privileges or immunities" clause, which pro-
vides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Court
held that "the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States ...
lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the
Federal government." 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77.
[Vol. 61:399
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preme Court had occasion to consider whether a Kansas statute
barring the manufacture and sale of "intoxicating liquors" consti-
tuted a denial of due process."' Despite counsel's reliance on that
leading New York State case-Wynehamer v. People,14 seemingly
right on point-the Supreme Court held that it did not. The
Court, however, made clear its belief that the fourteenth amend-
ment applied to the states, specifically noting that state legislation
could "come within" the amendment if "it is apparent that [the
legislation's] real object is not to protect the community, or to pro-
mote the general well-being, but, under the guise of police regula-
tion, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due
process of law."'15
By the end of the century, the Supreme Court's oft-repeated
suggestion"1 ripened into a holding. The Court struck down, as vio-
lative of the federal due process clause, a Louisiana statute regu-
lating the issuance of marine insurance, ushering in the "Lochner
era" of substantive due process.17 Although that era ended dramat-
ically in 1937,18 two legacies remain viable to this day. First, the
federal due process clause applies to the states and sets a floor be-
low which state conduct may not fall. And second, one of the tasks
of the Supreme Court is to establish where that floor should be set.
To this extent, the fourteenth amendment modified the vision of
two independent sovereigns described by Chief Justice Marshall in
Barron v. City of Baltimore. However, for present purposes, it is
more important to recognize what the fourteenth amendment did
not do: it did not alter the other half of the Barron formula-that
each state by its own constitution may limit and restrict its own
powers as its wisdom suggests.
In short, as a historical matter, state constitutions exist and
function independently of the federal Constitution. As the New
York Court of Appeals concluded in 1911, Supreme Court interpre-
"3 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
H See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
" Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
16 See The Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27 (1885); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
17 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). The "Lochner era" is, of course, named
for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in which the Court invalidated a New York
law setting maximum working hours for bakers..
18 Compare West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum
wage legislation) with Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invali-
dating similar legislation).
1987]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:399
tations of the fourteenth amendment are simply not "controlling of
our construction of our own Constitution.""9 Decades after the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, state and federal courts
continued to function as a partnership of equals in the protection
of constitutional rights.
While dual federalism remained theoretically intact, one of the
two partners thereafter began to play a more dominant role. This
trend may, for convenience, be dated to 1938-when the Supreme
Court suggested in United States v. Carotene Products Co. 20 that
the specific prohibitions of the first ten amendments might be em-
braced within the fourteenth amendment and apply to the states.2'
The process of incorporation accelerated sharply during the 1960's.
By 1969, all or part of the first,22 fourth,23 fifth,24 sixth25 and
eighth26 amendments were applied to the states.
At the same time-while expressing dissatisfaction with many
20 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 317, 94 N.E. 431, 448 (1911).
20 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
21 See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (due process clause protects freedom of speech); Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380 (1927) (same); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (due
process clause protects right to just compensation). Justice Black's well-known view that the
fourteenth amendment guaranteed that "no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges
and protections of the Bill of Rights," Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 74-75 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting), did not prevail.
22 See Everson v. Bohrd of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (non-establishment of religion);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise of religion); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496 (1939) (right to petition); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of
assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of press); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech).
22 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule); Wolf v. Colorado, 338
U.S. 25 (1949) (unreasonable search and seizure).
24 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination).
25 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury in criminal
cases); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (right to confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to coun-
sel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to public trial).
21 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment).
Provisions of the first eight amendments that have not been made applicable to the states
through incorporation but are found in the New York State Bill of Rights include the fifth
amendment right not to be tried except upon indictment by a grand jury, N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 6; see People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 593 n.3, 384 N.E.2d 656, 659 n.3, 412 N.Y.S.2d
110, 113 n.3 (1978); the seventh amendment right to trial by jury in a civil case, N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 2; and the eighth amendment right to nonexcessive bail, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5; see
People ex ret. Klein v. Krueger, 25 N.Y.2d 497, 499 n.1, 255 N.E.2d 552, 553 n.1, 307
N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 n.1 (1969).
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state courts' discharge of their "front-line responsibility for the en-
forcement of constitutional rights" 27-the Supreme Court began
actively widening and raising the federal floor. Individual rights
became increasingly federalized. The broadening application of
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights to the states "made U.S.
Supreme Court law the touchstone for much of the nation's consti-
tutional decisionmaking concerning individual rights. '28 These are
the years in which many of us received our professional education
and training. As lawyers, we have acquired an "easy familiarity with
the federal Bill of Rights and have grown accustomed to control-
ling federal precedents in the adjudication of constitutional rights
of the citizens of this State, even though this is in fact a relatively
new development in our nation's history.
In our dual system, the Supreme Court's growing dominance
necessarily affected constitutional law as applied by state courts.
While state courts have at all times been important contributors to
the body of constitutional law, they too became involved in the
application of federal law. So long as the federal floor, or national
minimum, was satisfied, state courts could have imposed ceilings in
the form of greater rights applicable within their own borders
under their own constitutions, and these judgments would then
have been conclusive, beyond Supreme Court review. 29 But as a
17 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Brennan, The Bill of Rights and
the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 777-78 (1961); Countryman, State Bill, supra note 1, at
455; Project Report, supra note 3, at 274. "The states had achieved a dismal record of em-
ploying their state constitutions. As Professor Paulsen wrote in 1951, '[I]f our liberties are
not protected in Des Moines, the only hope is in Washington."' Mosk, Liberal and Con-
servative, supra note 5, at 1084 (quoting Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and
First Amendment Freedom, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642 (1951)); see also LUKAS, COMMON
GROUND: A TURBULENT DECADE IN THE LIVEs OF THREE AMERICAN FAMILIEs 222 (1986).
28 Collins & Galie, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 322. To give but one example of
the expansion, in the 1920's the Supreme Court upheld, as consistent with the first amend-
ment, state statutes prohibiting the advocacy of criminal anarchy. See Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Although the progression
was not smooth, see, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (convictions affirmed
of Communist Party leaders for knowingly and willfully conspiring to organize a group to
teach and advocate overthrow of federal government), by the late 1950's the Court had
moved toward a distinction between advocacy of doctrine and unprotected advocacy of ac-
tion. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). This trend culminated in 1969 in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), which overruled Whitney v. Califor-
nia, and where the Court held that the first amendment barred the states from penalizing
advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" unless it was "likely to
incite or produce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. See also Brennan, State Con-
stitutions, supra note 1, at 490, 493.
29 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v.
19871
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practical matter, the federal guarantees as then interpreted by the
Supreme Court in general not only satisfied but often exceeded
their. view of the requirements of comparable state provisions."0
This same fundamental dualism has more recently sparked
the heightened interest in state constitutional law, but now it is
the state courts that are expressing dissatisfaction with the Su-
preme Court's role in the enforcement of constitutional rights. 1
While state courts interpreting parallel provisions of their charters
may have been satisfied in particular cases that the federal floor
also established their own ceiling, reformulation of the floor cannot
help but bring the rest of the structure into question. The point to
be drawn from history, however, is that in a system of government
that is founded upon dual sovereignties, independent state court
adjudications based on state constitutions-two layers of constitu-
tional protection-are hardly revolutionary or illegitimate.
This heightened interest in state constitutional law has gained
impetus from other developments in the United States Supreme
Court, not the least of which have been the writings of individual
Justices. 2 Of the past few years, to my mind a most significant
development in this regard has been the 1983 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Michigan v. Long."
The question of when a state court judgment is subject to Su-
preme Court review, and the source of such authority, is not easily
answered, except we know that as a matter of policy a state judg-
ment will not be reviewed if it rests on a nonfederal ground which
is independent of the federal question in the case and adequate to
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60 (1968).
30 People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 250, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906
(1981).
31 See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 115, 545 P.2d 272, 281, 127 Cal. Rptr.
360, 369 (1976) (collecting cases); State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 471 A.2d 347 (1983); State v.
Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501
N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987); see also Brennan,
State Constitutions, supra note 1, at 498-502.
2 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brennan, Bill of
Rights, supra note 1, at 552; Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1, at 491. "In recent
years particularly the Supreme Court has emphasized and encouraged this and related as-
pects of Federalism by exercising special restraint in prescribing constitutional rules of pro-
cedure which would displace or foreclose development of State rules specifically tailored to
local problems and experiences." People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 250, 423 N.E.2d 379, 383,
440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (1981) (citations omitted).
s3 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
[Vol. 61:399
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support the judgment.34 What is an "adequate and independent"
state ground has itself remained elusive, and appears to have been
determined by any of several techniques applied on an ad hoc and
largely unexplained basis. Until Michigan v. Long, however, it was
safe to assume that any lack of clarity as to the basis of a state
court judgment would be resolved in favor of the state court as the
final arbiter, and against further review. Michigan v. Long, of
course, reversed this historical presumption. As a result, more state
court judgments extending the rights of its citizens will, for the
time being, be brought under Supreme Court scrutiny.
However much one might be discomfited by this shift or by
the new methodology, Michigan v. Long has sharply focused the
issue; it has staked out the state courts' sphere of autonomy; and it
has given the state courts the ability to assure that they remain the
ultimate arbiters of state law decisions. Where a state court makes
clear that its judgment rests on bona fide separate, adequate and
independent grounds, the Supreme Court has declared that it will
not review that decision. As Justice O'Connor wrote: "We believe
that such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer op-
portunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal in-
terference, and yet will preserve the integrity of federal law. '" 3 5
Justice Stevens has added a further ingredient: it is not only
fundamental that state courts be left free to develop their own ju-
risprudence but also, from the federal perspective, desirable and
important that they do so. Justice Stevens, in a recent concur-
rence, took the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to task
for premising a decision on federal grounds, needlessly inviting Su-
preme Court review and ultimately remand for a decision on state
grounds, when it might have finally resolved the issue in the first
instance under its own constitution.36 In charging the Massachu-
34 "The reason for th[e] restraint is that the Supreme Court decision on the federal
question would be merely an advisory opinion . . . ." Pollock, State and Federal Courts,
supra note 6, at 980. See generally Baker, State Ground, supra note 6, at 804 (independent
and adequate state grounds examined on "constitutional, statutory, and prudential" levels).
35 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1041. See also New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986),
rev'g 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984). But see Bamberger, Meth-
odology, supra note 1, at 296 (noting that the Court "has indicated a strong willingness to
review state court decisions" since Michigan v. Long). The significance of Michigan v. Long
to the issue at hand possibly outdistances its contribution to the law on the fourth
amendment.
30 Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. at 735 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also South
Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 566-71 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As the Vermont
Supreme Court wrote in State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 450 A.2d 336 (1982), "[flulfillment of
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
setts court with "a misconception of our constitutional heritage
and the respective jurisdictions of state and federal courts," 37 Jus-
tice Stevens echoed a sentiment found in our earliest history, that
the states in our federal system are the primary guardian of the
liberty of the people. This is a premise of our constitutional
system.
As a matter of history, therefore, it is hardly a novel doctrine
that underlies contemporary interest in independent state court
adjudication of concurrent constitutional provisions.
II
Against this background, I would like to turn to New York
State in particular.
As an expression of inviolable principle and fundamental law,
the New York Constitution is a curious document-particularly
when compared with the United States Constitution. I mean this
in two respects.
First, the State Constitution is long and filled with detail, like
a volume of miscellaneous statutes, specifying even-as a matter of
constitutional dimension-the width of certain ski trails. The arti-
cle dealing with local finances (article VIII) is longer than the en-
tire federal Constitution. Since its enactment 210 years ago, it has
swelled in size and scope, particularly in the aftermath of the De-
pression, as part of the amendments of 1938. Provisions relating to
barge canals, elimination of railroad grade crossings, social welfare
and returning veterans reflect paramount concerns at given mo-
ments in the rich history of this State, alongside the abiding con-
cern in our extensive Bill of Rights and throughout the constitu-
tion for fundamental rights and individual liberty.
Second, while the federal Constitution has been amended only
twenty-six times in its entire history, the State Constitution has
been amended often, for the most part in isolated fragments initi-
ated by the legislature and thereafter approved by the People at a
general election. 8 The Constitution has also been extensively re-
this Court's responsibilities as a member of the federalist system requires us to consider the
availability of state grounds before federal appeal." Id. at 448, 450 A.2d at 347.
Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
'8 New York has actually had four constitutions: those of 1777, 1821, 1846 (the "Peo-
ple's Constitution") and 1894. The 1894 Constitution, extensively revised and supplemented
in 1938, remains in effect today. Since its first amendments in 1801, the New York Constitu-
tion has also undergone steady piecemeal revision, initiated by one legislature, approved by
[Vol. 61:399
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vised as the consequence of constitutional conventions, although
the 1938 Convention was the only one in this century to have its
major work accepted; the reports of the 1915 and 1967 Conven-
tions were entirely rejected by the voters. Additionally, as the con-
stitution itself directs, every twenty years, and whenever the legis-
lature provides, the People are asked at a general election, "Shall
there be a convention to revise the constitution and amend the
same?"3 e
The combination of high detail and accessibility of the amend-
ment process gives our Constitution a distinctive New York char-
acter. It is a product and expression of this State.
While current interest centers on the common provisions of
our two constitutions, to proceed right to that issue ignores the
fact that the People of this State have chosen to "constitutional-
ize" a great number of other matters in the Bill of Rights and
throughout the State Constitution. Fortuitously, the heightened
interest in concurrent provisions has drawn attention as well to the
many matters uniquely part of the state charter.
I will not linger long on a recitation of the provisions of the
State Constitution that have no specific analogue or counterpart in
the federal document. No one would question that, though other
considerations such as due process or equal protection may also be
implicated, these singular provisions must at some point be ana-
lyzed as a matter of state law.
Our State Constitution provides, for example, the right to a
free education40 and declares that the aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns.41 It directs that provision be made for
the next, and then approved by the public at a general election. See C. LINCOLN, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1905) (comprehensive early history of State Constitu-
tion); id. at 613 (critical assessment of amendment process as "rather too easy").
While the resolution for a convention to draw a constitution also provided for a bill of
rights, the 1777 Constitution contained no bill of rights; indeed, a formal bill of rights was
first added to the State Constitution in 1846. The 1777 Constitution, however, continued the
English bill of rights, and further provided for a right to vote, trial by jury, right to counsel,
and religious liberty. This Constitution established the three branches of government and
bicameral legislature that persist to this day as the structural framework of our state, as well
as national, government. It was at the time regarded as "'the most excellent of all the
American Constitutions.'" Id. at 559.
0 N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
40 Id. art. IX, § 1; see Levittown Union Free School Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 47-
48, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 652-53 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1138,
1139 (1983).
4 N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1.
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the protection and promotion of public health, and it recognizes
that the legislature in its discretion may provide for low-rent hous-
ing and nursing home accommodations for persons of low income."2
It specifies that environmental conservation is a policy of this
State, and mandates that adequate provision be made for abate-
ment of pollution and noise.43 As a matter of constitutional direc-
tive, certain executive rules and regulations cannot be enforced un-
til they have been publicly filed.44 The benefits of membership in a
state pension or retirement system may not be impaired,45 and the
jurisdiction of the Appellate Divisions to hear appeals may not be
State aid to the needy was deemed to be a fundamental part of the social
contract ....
[I]t is clear that section 1 of article XVII imposes upon the State an affirma-
tive duty to aid the needy.... Although our Constitution provides the Legislature
with discretion in determining the means by which this objective is to be effectu-
ated, in determining the amount of aid, and in classifying recipients and defining
the term 'needy', it unequivocally prevents the Legislature from simply refusing to
aid those whom it has classified as needy. Such a definite constitutional mandate
cannot be ignored or easily evaded in either its letter or its spirit.
Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7-8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 454, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730-31 (1977); see
also McCain v. Koch, 70 N.Y.2d 109, 511 N.E.2d 62, 517 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1987), rev'g 117 App.
Div. 2d 198, 501 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1st Dep't 1986); Lee v. Smith, 43 N.Y.2d 453, 373 N.E.2d
247, 402 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1977); Wilkins v. Perales, 119 App. Div. 2d 1018, 501 N.Y.S.2d 549
(1st Dep't 1986), aff'g 128 Misc. 2d 265, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985);
Eldredge v. Koch, 98 App. Div. 2d 675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1983); Note, Establish-
ing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 939 (1984); Note, A Right to
Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272 (1986).
42 N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; id. art. XVIII, § 1. See Suffolk Hous. Servs. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 70 N.Y.2d 122, 511 N.E.2d 67, 517 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1987), af'g 109 App. Div. 2d
323, 491 N.Y.S.2d 396 (2d Dep't 1985); Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of
Upper Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 414 N.E.2d 680, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S, 1042 (1981); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Cf. Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel II), 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983);
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
11 N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4.
44 Id. art. IV, § 8. See Davidson v. Smith, 69 N.Y.2d 677, 504 N.E.2d 380, 512 N.Y.S.2d
13 (1986); People ex rel. Roides v. Smith, 67 N.Y.2d 899, 492 N.E.2d 191, 489 N.Y.S.2d 50
(1986); Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y.2d 1003, 478 N.E.2d 191, 501 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1985); New York
State Coalition of Pub. Employers v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 60 N.Y.2d 789, 457
N.E.2d 785, 469 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1983); People v. Cull, 10 N.Y.2d 123, 176 N.E.2d 495, 218
N.Y.S.2d 38 (1961).
'1 N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 7. See Lippman v. Board of Educ., 66 N.Y.2d 313, 487 N.E.2d
897, 496 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1985).
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diminished.46 The Bill of Rights bars the abrogation of a cause of
action for wrongful death; it guarantees the right of workers to the
prevailing wage, and to organize and bargain collectively; and it
provides for workers' compensation.
Given its laborious detail, our Constitution may not in every
phrase ring with the majesty of Chief Justice Marshall's declara-
tion: "it is a constitution we are expounding. '48 But it is a consti-
tution we are expounding, and its commands are therefore entitled
to the particular deference that courts are obliged to accord mat-
ters of constitutional magnitude. To borrow former Chief Judge
Breitel's eloquent words, in overturning the moratorium on en-
forcement of city obligations as violative of the state constitutional
requirement of a pledge of faith and credit: "it is a Constitution
that is being interpreted and as a Constitution it would serve little
of its purpose if all that it promised, like the elegantly phrased
Constitutions of some totalitarian or dictatorial Nations, was an
ideal to be worshipped when not needed and debased when
crucial.' 49
One cannot help but wonder, reading our Constitution, why
some seemingly everyday matters were elevated to a place in that
document of fundamental law and, even beyond, enshrined in its
Bill of Rights. Many of these matters were and are the subject of
state statutes, some additionally the subject of federal statutes.
They were nonetheless purposefully placed in our State Constitu-
tion-within an ambit of special deference and protection-in
many instances to declare the existence of a right and correlative
commitment by the State, to put them beyond repeal by the legis-
lature, and to insure that derivative legislation involving the ex-
penditure of state money and credit would not be cast out as un-
constitutional by the judiciary. The People have declared to the
courts and others that, as part of the Constitution, these matters
stand above the miscellaneous statutes as their expression of what
they consider to be particularly important and not subject to revi-
sion except by them.
46 N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 4(k). Section 4(k) provides that the Appellate Divisions shall
have all the jurisdiction possessed by them on the effective date of the article. See id.; Peo-
ple v. Pollenz, 67 N.Y.2d 264, 270, 493 N.E.2d 541, 544, 502 N.Y.S.2d 417, 420 (1986).
47 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16 (wrongful death); id. § 17 (labor); id. § 18 (workers' com-
pensation).
48 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
49 Flushing Nat'l Bank v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 739, 358 N.E.2d
848, 854, 390 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (1976).
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This being so as to the provisions that have no federal ana-
logue or counterpart, no less can be said of the provisions of our
State Constitution that do have a parallel in the federal Constitu-
tion. These provisions have obviously also been placed, and re-
tained, in our Constitution as an expression of the significance they
have within this State.
III
Where the text of a state constitution deals with matters not
enumerated federally there is obviously basis-indeed neces-
sity-for independent interpretation. Similarly, where there are
material textual differences between a state constitution and a cor-
responding provision of the federal Constitution, there is little dif-
ficulty concluding that something different may have been in-
tended. Does the absence of textual difference in comparable
provisions preclude principled independent analysis under the
state constitution?
History itself answers this question. The federal Constitution
was, after all, taken from state models. Provisions of our State
Constitution have been drawn from the federal document, and
many of the same individuals had their hand in both. Common
objectives, common drafters and common models naturally engen-
der common texts. Yet it is most significant that, as a political act,
two separate constitutions were adopted, neither expressly super-
seding the other, and two have endured. As a juridical act, there-
fore, constitutional analysis by state courts cannot stop with a
mechanical matching of texts; significant protections of a state
constitution are otherwise relegated to redundancy.50
In this State, in fact, there is a long tradition of reading the
parallel clauses independently and affording broader protection,
where appropriate, under the State Constitution. One commenta-
tor, having studied the New York cases between 1960 and 1978,
has concluded that the courts of this State have consistently recog-
nized the independent value of their own constitutional traditions,
a recognition that "is not a recent phenomenon brought about by
50 For an example of a state's choice so to treat a provision of its own constitution, see
FL& CONST. art. I, § 12. The Florida Constitution mandates that the state's search and
seizure guarantee be construed in conformity with the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. Id. See generally Wilkes, First
Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights, 54 Miss. L.J. 223 (1984).
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the Burger Court's retrenchment in criminal procedure."51 In this
connection, a substantive area that springs to mind is the right of
an accused to the assistance of counsel, found in similar words in
both Bills of Rights. The right to counsel was first set out in the
State Constitution of 1777. From earliest times, this right has been
insisted upon in our case law and given wider scope than the corre-
sponding federal right. The New York decisions upholding the
right to counsel have been characterized as "the strongest protec-
tion of right to counsel anywhere in the country," and cited as "a
striking illustration of a constitutional tradition that has developed
on its own terms and, thus, was not susceptible to the vagaries of
changing Supreme Courts. '52
The reasons why separate interpretation and broader protec-
tion under the State Constitution may be appropriate are perhaps
best shown by two additional examples of parallel provisions: the
due process clause and the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
The New York Constitution's due process clause, enacted
before the fourteenth amendment, concludes: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
The fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution provides:
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." Does due process under the State
Constitution mean whatever the Supreme Court says due process
means under the federal Constitution?
Early in its history, in the Ives case,53 New York's due process
clause became the basis for striking down the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of 1910, a statute requiring employers, irrespective of
fault, to contribute to an insurance fund to benefit employees in-
jured in the course of employment. That unanimous opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals was immediately and immensely un-
popular. It was publicly declaimed by Theodore Roosevelt, then
planning his Progressive political movement; it led to amendment
of the state constitution specifically to include workers' compensa-
51 Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendants' Rights: The
Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALo L. REv. 157, 192 (1979); see also Kramer & Riga,
The New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, 1960-76, 8 PUBLIUS
75 (1978).
5' Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts,
33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 731, 764, 765 (1982). See also People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
51 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
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tion in no less than the Bill of Rights; it was rejected nationally;
and it cost the author of the offending opinion the chief judgeship
of the Court of Appeals in the next election. That decision has,
moreover, earned a permanent place in the study of jurisprudence,
as an example of how a court's choice of methodology can dictate
the outcome of a case. 4
But apart from its historical, political and jurisprudential in-
terest, Ives is also relevant to the present discussion in that two
proffered decisions of the United States Supreme Court which sup-
ported the validity of the statute were rejected by the Court of
Appeals as "not controlling of our construction of our own Consti-
tution." The court wrote:
[a]ll that it is necessary to affirm in the case before us is that in
our view of the Constitution of our state, the liability sought to be
imposed upon the employers enumerated in the statute before us
is a taking of property without due process of law, and the statute
is therefore void.55
Ives thus stands as a declaration of the independence of the state
court in construing the due process clause of its state constitution.
A statute possibly valid as a matter of federal due process nonethe-
less was upset as a matter of state due process.
Since Ives, New York courts have drawn on the State's consti-
tutional history, as well as its judicial history, in having accorded
the due process clause wider scope than its federal counterpart.
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc.,56 for example, involved a
challenge under the state and federal due process clauses to the
statutory lien enabling garagemen to foreclose for delinquent re-
pair and storage charges. Two months earlier, the Supreme Court
had made clear that a private sale of property subject to a ware-
houseman's possessory lien did not constitute "state action" for
purposes of the fourteenth amendment,57 a holding which might
have been dispositive. The New York Court of Appeals, however,
recognized that it could, and in this instance should, give a broader
reading to the "state action" requirement because the state due
process clause-unlike its federal counterpart-contains no refer-
See F. BERGAN, THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, 1847-1932 245-47
(1985); see also B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 71 (1924); cf. New York Cent. R.R.
Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (upholding New York's Workmen's Compensation Law).
" Ives, 201 N.Y. at 317, 94 N.E. at 448.
86 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978).
"' Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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ence to "state." The material factors cited by the Court of Appeals
in invalidating the statute were the difference in constitutional
text, the history of the clause within New York, the long record of
due process protections particularly afforded our citizens, and fun-
damental principles of federalism.5
Thus, the treatment afforded the State due process clause
shows that any difference between texts may become significant in
particular cases as a point of departure from federal precedents.
Moreover, how a concurrent provision arrived in our charter, as
well as how it has been interpreted within this State, may signal
whether, in certain cases, greater rights should be afforded under
the State Constitution.5 9
to 45 N.Y.2d at 159-61, 379 N.E.2d at 1173-74, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 43-45. See also Svend-
sen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking Co., 54 N.Y.2d 865, 429 N.E.2d 411, 444 N.Y.S.2d 904
(1981) (mem.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 927 (1982). The dissent in Sharrock v. Dell Buick-
Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 169, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1179-80, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39, 50 (Jasen, J.,
dissenting), and the concurrence in Svendsen, 54 N.Y.2d at 868, 429 N.E.2d at 412, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 905 (Jasen, J., concurring), would instead have relied on the per curiam opinion
in Central Savings Bank v. City of New York, 280 N.Y. 9, 19 N.E.2d 659 (1939), cert. de-
nied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939), in which the Court of Appeals held, on remittitur, that the state
and federal due process "clauses are formulated in the same words and are intended for the
protection of the same fundamental rights of the individual and there is, logically, no room
for distinction in definition of the scope of the two clauses." Id. at 10, 19 N.E.2d at 659. The
court explained that the conclusion in its original opinion that the amendment violated the
state due process clause "followed necessarily from our determination that in accordance
with a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the statute is repug-
nant to the Federal Constitution." Id.
One is hard pressed, however, to find the "long line" of due process decisions of the
Supreme Court purportedly relied upon by the Court of Appeals in Central Savings Bank.
Moreover, construction of the state and federal due process clauses as identical was wholly
unnecessary. As the Court of Appeals noted,
We did not by reference solely to the Constitution of the State intend to indicate
that though we cannot give validity to a statute which is repugnant to the due
process clause in the Federal Constitution we would give wider scope to the same
clause in the State Constitution and hold invalid statutes not repugnant to the
Federal Constitution as defined by the Supreme Court. No such question was
presented or considered in this court.
Id.
to An "interpretive" analysis considers whether the language of a state constitution spe-
cifically recognizes rights not enumerated in the federal Constitution; whether language in a
state constitution is sufficiently different to support a broader interpretation of the individ-
ual right under state law; whether the history of the adoption of the text reveals an inten-
tion to make the state provision coextensive with, or broader than, the parallel federal pro-
vision; and whether the very structure and purpose of the state constitution serves to affirm
certain rights rather than merely restrain the sovereign power of the state. A "noninterpre-
tive" analysis deals with other matters, such as policy and tradition of the state. See People
v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302-03, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560-61, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911-12
(1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987). See also Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court
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In contrast, the state protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures has neither this textual nor historical distinction from
the federal Constitution." Indeed, article I, section 12, taken word-
for-word from the fourth amendment, did not become part of the
State Constitution-in fact, New York possibly was the last state
to adopt it-until 1938.
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures it-
self generated little dispute at the 1938 Convention-that very
protection had for a decade already been contained in the Civil
Rights Law-but there were heated exchanges regarding the exclu-
sionary rule. The Supreme Court had held that the exclusion of
evidence in federal courts was essential to meaningful protection
against intrusive searches,61 but the New York Court of Appeals
chose not to accept that holding as a matter of state law. Writing
for the New York court, Judge Cardozo observed that state courts
were not bound to interpret their own statutes in the same manner
as the federal courts had interpreted the federal Constitution, and
concluded that the public policy of New York favored rejection of
the exclusionary rule.6 2 Ultimately, the protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures was added to the State Constitution
Activism, 63 TEx. L. REv. 995 (1985) (questioning value of yet another layer of noninterpre-
tive review).
60 The analysis with respect to search and seizure pertains as well to the equal protec-
tion clause. Despite an identity of text and history, the Court of Appeals on occasion has
concluded that greater rights should be accorded under the equal protection clause of the
State Constitution. The equal protection provision approved at the 1938 Constitutional
Convention, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11, was designed simply to embody "'in our Constitution
the provisions of the Federal Constitution which are already binding upon our State and its
agencies.'" Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 530, 87 N.E.2d 541, 552 (1949)
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950). See also Under 21 v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 360, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7-8, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522, 528-29 (1985) (applying
federal precedents); Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306, 313-14, 437 N.E.2d 1090, 1094-95, 452
N.Y.S.2d 333, 337-38 (1982) (same coverage as under federal provision). In Cooper v. Morin,
49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980),
however, the Court of Appeals, concluding that the denial of contact visitation privileges to
pretrial detainees would not violate the federal Constitution, found this unacceptable as a
matter of state law. The court wrote:
We have not hesitated when we concluded that the Federal Constitution as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court fell short of adequate protection for our citizens to
rely upon the principle that that document defines the minimum level of individ-
ual rights and leaves the States free to provide greater rights for its citizens
through its Constitution, statutes or rule-making authority.
Id. at 79, 399 N.E.2d at 1193, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 174.
61 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
62 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926).
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but an explicit exclusionary rule was not, thus leaving open the
issue whether the exclusion of evidence was to follow implicitly, as
it did under the federal scheme. Subsequently, the courts have
held that it does.63
Faced with this history and text, for many years, when consid-
ering state search and seizure arguments, the Court of Appeals
chose to follow a policy of uniformity with the federal courts."
This meant that New York in general followed fourth amendment
precedents, recognizing as a valued consequence that police officers
and reviewing courts would thereby have but one bright-line rule
to guide them." Two significant factors, of course, attended that
policy. First, as in all things, continuing a policy of conformity nec-
essarily depends upon the continuation of that to which one has
chosen to conform. And second, a policy of having a single worka-
ble rule can as readily be served by imposing a higher state stan-
dard as by conforming to the federal standard. As the Court of
Appeals recently noted, the interest of uniformity is only "one con-
sideration to be balanced against other considerations that may ar-
gue for a different State rule. When weighed against the ability to
protect fundamental constitutional rights, the practical need for
uniformity can seldom be a decisive factor."66
Where the text and history of a provision point to uniform-
ity-and without addressing whether a state court should first con-
sider the federal precedents or its own state law, itself a subject of
lively difference 67 -what other factors have nonetheless motivated
11 For a discussion of the relevant history, see People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 408,
488 N.E.2d 439, 446-47, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 625-26 (1985) (Titone, J., concurring).
" See, e.g., People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165, 429 N.E.2d 735, 737-38, 445 N.Y.S.2d
57, 59 (1981).
11 Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624; People v. Gonza-
lez, 62 N.Y.2d 386, 389-90, 465 N.E.2d 823, 824-25, 477 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (1984).
"' People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 304, 501 N.E.2d 556, 561, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907,
912-13 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987).
17 Three modes of analysis have been identified: reliance on both state and Federal
Constitutions; the "primacy" approach, i.e., looking first to the state constitution; and the
"interstitial" or supplemental approach, i.e., consulting the state constitution if action is
first found valid under the federal Constitution. See Pollock, State and Federal Courts,
supra note 6, at 983-86; Bamberger, Methodology, supra note 1, at 301. Compare Sterling v.
Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (1981) (state constitutional law examined prior to
federal constitutional analysis) with Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 301, 450 A.2d
925, 932 (1982) (survey of federal decisions appropriate before adjudiciation of state consti-
tutional claim). See also Baker, State Ground, supra note 6, at 833 (discussion of primary,
supplemental, and co-equal theories); Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. Rlv. 165, 178-79 (1984) (state law analysis prior to consideration of federal
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the conclusion that greater protection should be afforded under
state law?
A response to that question lies in the fact that the Supreme
Court's role is to establish only the minimal level, the lowest com-
mon denominator of individual rights applicable throughout the
nation, while it is the role of state courts, in discharging their addi-
tional responsibility to uphold their own constitutions, to safe-
guard and supplement those rights where necessary."8 Sound policy
considerations have therefore been cited as the basis for different
interpretations of common provisions-such considerations as stat-
utes or common law, traditions of the state, and distinctive public
attitudes toward the scope, defintion and protection of the right in
question. An argument for a broader construction under a state
constitution than that established under the federal Constitution
requires more than merely urging that some other result is
preferred.69
It has long been recognized that issues relating to free expres-
claim); Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the State Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv.
379, 380 (1980) (states bill of rights "first in time" and "first in logic") [hereinafter Linde,
First Things First].
In three recent cases, the Court of Appeals has expressly premised its decisions on fed-
eral law and equally on an adequate and independent state ground. See Patchogue-Medford
Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456
(1987); People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 519, 508 N.E.2d 903, 905, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170-71
(1987); People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 316, 506 N.E.2d 911, 912, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202
(1987).
68 See People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492,
494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 250, 423 N.E.2d 379,
383, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 906 (1981); see also Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 399 N.E.2d 1188,
424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979) (state constitution entitled pretrial detainee to right of visitation),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); Brennan, The Roles of the State Supreme Court Justice
and the United States Supreme Court Justices, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 6 (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter
Brennan, Roles of Justice].
69 See State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (1982) (list of relevant considerations in
this determination). "[T]o make an independent argument under the state clause takes
homework - in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis. It is not enough to
ask the state court to reject a Supreme Court opinion on the comparable federal clause
merely because one prefers the opposite result." Linde, First Things First, supra note 67, at
392. See also Bamberger, Methodology, supra note 1, at 306; Howard, State Courts and
Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 934-44 (1976). In
State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 A.2d 233 (1985), the Vermont Supreme Court declined to
address the state constitutional issue raised because the parties had failed to discuss it ade-
quately in their briefs and directed that supplemental briefs be filed on the issue. Id. at 228-
29, 500 A.2d at 237-39. In response to the decision, the Vermont Attorney General set up a
committee to research history and precedents connected with the Vermont Constitution.
Collins & Galie, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 335.
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sion involve community standards and traditions; disputes regard-
ing land use are another example raising policy concerns peculiar
to the state. 0 Considerations of policy have similarly led the New
York Court of Appeals to depart from federal precedents in search
and seizure cases.71 For example, by decisional law developed over
the years, clear, definable standards had been established and con-
sistently applied to probable cause determinations within this
State. The New York Court of Appeals in recent cases has contin-
ued to apply those standards as a matter of state constitutional
law under article I, section 12. Its departure from fourth amend-
ment precedents has been expressly predicated on policy consider-
ations, particularly the perception that the Supreme Court of late
had changed the federal standards, muddying the rules and dilut-
ing judicial supervision of the warrant process, thereby "heighten-
ing the danger that our citizens' rights against unreasonable police
intrusions might be violated. 71 2
70 See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (speech); People
ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986)
(same); SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d
99 (1985) (same); Bellanca v. State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 429 N.E.2d 765, 445
N.Y.S.2d 87 (1981) (same), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982); People v. Barber, 289 N.Y.
378, 384, 46 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1943) (same); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d 544,
488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985) (land use); Pollock, State Constitutions, Land
Use and Public Resources: The Gift Outright, in WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE, supra note 1,
at 146.
71 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 497
N.Y.S.2d 630 (1935); People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618
(1985). See Comment, Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution: Revised
Interpretation in Wake of New Federal Standards?, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 770 (1986). Most
recently, the Court of Appeals in Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Ed-
ucation, 70 N.Y.2d 57, 510 N.E.2d 325, 517 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1987), concluded that the consti-
tutionality of compulsory urine testing for public school teachers - raising issues of wide
public importance - "presents a type of inquiry appropriate for resolution under the State
Constitution." Id. at 65, 510 N.E.2d at 327-28, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
72 P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913; see also State
v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 496 A.2d 498 (1985). As Chief Justice Peters of the Connecticut
Supreme Court recently noted, in choosing as a matter of state constitutional law to adhere
to the "well-developed federal test" of Aguilar-Spinelli, instead of the newer, "less strin-
gent" test of Illinois v. Gates,
[T]he Connecticut court was able to profit from a developed history of an estab-
lished, workable test for warrantless searches, without having to commit itself to
changing federal views on the reach of the fourth amendment. We were reinforced
in our view of our constitution by a similar decision reached by a Massachusetts
court with similar constitutional history.
E. Peters, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference, at 3 (Sept. 5, 1986) (unpub-
lished text); cf. Peters, Remarks, supra note 3, 115 F.R.D. at 405-09 (published version of
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Thus, despite perceived or even actual identity of texts, there
may in particular instances be principled basis for broader protec-
tion within this State because of our history in adopting or apply-
ing a clause, or for other reasons. While language differences be-
tween the two constitutions may determine that there is a need for
independent analysis, where our Constitution is at issue, the fact
that there is no language difference does not spell the end of state
judicial review. It invites inquiry into matters of history, tradition,
policy and other special state concerns.
IV
I would like to shift the focus from the historical and practical
to the theoretical by asking, is independent state court adjudica-
tion of parallel protections supported by a cohesive theory, or is
this merely a passing disagreement with particular decisions of the
United States Supreme Court?
Currently, a great debate rages in the law as to how a constitu-
tion should be interpreted. 3 Some insist that it must be read by
the intent of the framers; others assert that intent of the framers
cannot be controlling, and that the document must be interpreted
in light of prevailing attitudes and modern values. It occurs to me
that this issue, as well as the one at hand, both propel us to an
even more fundamental inquiry. We can answer the question of
how to interpret a constitution, whether state or federal, only by
first understanding what, in a real sense, a constitution is.
The very word "constitution," in common understanding,
means the most basic structure of a thing, how it is constituted.
The English regarded themselves as having a constitution long
before the Colonials began drawing up constitutions for themselves
on paper, yet the English constitution has never been written down
in a single document. That the English can speak of their unwrit-
ten constitution helps to underscore exactly what a constitution
means. A community's constitution is its basic make-up, the
source, delineation and delimitation of rights and powers within
that society, the collective assessment of the rules of the game
under which the process of decision-making and exercise of power
text). See also Collins & Galie, Judicial Review, supra note 1, at 318 n.3 (survey of state
decisions providing constitutional protections unavailable under federal constitution).
'3 See, e.g., Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV.
885 (1985); Wachtler, Will America Survive?, 41 REC. A.B. CITY OF N.Y. 191 (1986).
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within that community will proceed. As the very basis of a living
community, a constitution is necessarily a thing of that com-
munity.
The essential difference between English and American consti-
tutionalism is not that American constitutions are written. Rather,
it is that the English constitution is founded upon a concept of
parliamentary supremacy. Under English theory, constitutional
sovereignty resides in Parliament. The laws enacted by Parlia-
ment, though restrained by traditions and principles, are perforce
within the constitution. Our nation, by contrast, is rooted in a con-
cept that sovereignty resides in the People. Thus it is possible that
our designated lawmakers can at times enact laws that fall outside
the basic law established by the People. Where the People are sov-
ereign, their conception of their constitution exists apart from, and
above, ordinary legislative enactments.
The day-to-day function of a constitution, however, goes fur-
ther. It is a fact of human nature, and of the democratic process)
that our actions-both as individuals and as a commu-
nity-sometimes conflict with our most basic, or overarching, val-
ues. Therefore, what we set out to embody in a constitution are
those values we do not wish to sacrifice to more transient choices.
Our constitutional values can of course be explicitly changed, but
amendments are accomplished only through extraordinary political
processes-the approval of two successive legislatures followed by
a popular referendum in the case of the New York Constitution,
and the approval of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress and
three-fourths of the states in the case of the federal charter. 75 A
constitution, in short, is that set of values to which we have bound
ourselves, the values that transcend even our currently made
choices-or, in the words of James Madison, the values that
"counteract the impulses of interest and passion. '' T7
This is no abstraction but rather a reflection of the most abid-
ing reality of both our past and present. We talk a great deal about
the constitutional shield provided the People against the govern-
ment, but in a democracy the threats to our values often have pop-
ular support. The Constitution throughout history has been called
upon to protect long venerated values that are momentarily aban-
71 N.Y. CONST. art. MIX.
7" U.S. CONST. art. V.
71 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in THE
WRTNGS OF JAMS MADISON 273 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
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doned or neglected.
It is a function of constitutional law, then, to preserve a com-
munity's overarching values in the face of its transient choices.
And it is a significant function of the courts to ascertain and iden-
tify these most basic values, and flag them when they are at risk.
As Judge Cardozo aptly wrote in The Nature of the Judicial
Process:
The restraining power of the judiciary does not manifest its chief
worth in the few cases in which the legislature has gone beyond
the lines that mark the limits of discretion. Rather shall we find
its chief worth in making vocal and audible the ideals that might
otherwise be silenced, in giving them continuity of life and of ex-
pression, in guiding and directing choice within the limits where
choice ranges. This function should preserve to the courts the
power that now belongs to them, if only the power is exercised
with insight into social values, and with suppleness of adaptation
to changing social needs."
What many, most notably Justice Hugo Black, have sought in
a jurisprudence of original intent-the protection of civil liberties
by fixing us to an a priori commitment to them-cannot realisti-
cally be achieved in that manner. The right to a fair trial or free
speech does not exist today simply because a group of framers two
centuries ago intended them to exist. They can and do exist today
because we mean them to, even though at times we may do or say
otherwise. The overarching values of the past can and surely do
inform our inquiry into what values make up our "constitution"
today.78 We are, after all, interpreting a text, not inventing one.
7 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 94 (1921).
78 See United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
We may assume that the framers of the Constitution in adopting that section, did
not have specifically in mind the selection and elimination of candidates for Con-
gress by the direct primary any more than they contemplated the application of
the commerce clause to interstate telephone, telegraph and wireless communica-
tion, which are concededly within it. But in determining whether a provision of
the Constitution applies to a new subject matter, it is of little significance that it
is one with which the framers were not familiar. For in setting up an enduring
framework of government they undertook to carry out for the indefinite future
and in all the vicissitudes of the changing affairs of men, those fundamental pur-
poses which the instrument itself discloses. Hence we read its words, not as we
read legislative codes which are subject to continuous revision with the changing
course of events, but as the revelation of the great purposes which were intended
to be achieved by the Constitution as a continuing instrument of government.
Id. at 315-16 (Stone, J.).
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Moreover, we look to the past because our most basic values, when
they change, tend to do so very slowly, and then by a process of
evolution. But interpreting a constitution cannot stop with values
of the past. It necessarily involves as well a community's present
values-identifying the values that a community has declared
should limit the ordinary processes of its government.
All of this speaks with particular force, and has special rele-
vance, to the subject of state constitutions.
Where a provision has been adopted into a state constitution
from the federal charter, intent-based interpretation would obvi-
ously be unusually difficult. When dealing with intentions of sev-
eral distinct groups of framers and amenders, are we to look to the
intent of the federal framers, or the intent that the state framers
believed-perhaps erroneously-the federal framers held? Or did
the state framers intend something altogether different? A text-
based "contemporary values" approach fares no better. If we read
the words of all the constitutions of this nation in terms of what
those words mean today, it is hard to argue that the same words
have any different definition anywhere. Obviously, if there is any
variation across this nation it is not in the definition of the words
themselves, it is in the concepts they embody.
It should be immediately apparent that the Constitution es-
tablished by New York under threat of British invasion in 1777,
and painstakingly reviewed and amended throughout the ensuing
centuries, reflects its own values, which may or may not be identi-
cal to those held elsewhere.
Indeed, the history that has shaped the values of this State is
different in many respects from that which has shaped the consen-
sus in other states, not to mention our nation as a whole. Many
states today espouse cultural values distinctively their own. Alaska,
for instance, is unique in its constitutional guarantee of the right
to possess marijuana in one's home.7 If it is the judiciary's duty to
look at what a "constitution" represents in order to determine
what it says, and if what a constitution represents is that commu-
nity's most basic, overarching values, then it is only right to inter-
pret a state constitution independently of others, even where con-
cepts are expressed in the same words. An independent
70 See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska 1975). The court in part based its
holding on article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution, which states: "The right of the
people to privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed." See id. at 500-04.
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interpretation of course does not mean that identical clauses will
invariably be read differently, or more broadly, than their federal
counterparts or those of sister states.80 The Supreme Court, in
reading the federal Constitution, must lay out a minimal rule for a
diverse nation, with due concern for principles of federalism. State
courts, even when working with the same basic provisions, have a
different focus, which is to fashion workable rules for a narrower,
more specific range of people and situations. Their solutions thus
may at times be identical to the federal solutions, but they are not
necessarily so.8"
Practical considerations support this theory. State courts are
generally closer to the public, to the legal institutions and environ-
ments within the state, and to the public policy process. This both
shapes their strategic judgments and renders any erroneous assess-
ments they may make more readily redressable by the People.
Moreover, building a coherent body of law-one that is not merely
reacting to particular Supreme Court decisions, or waiting on the
Supreme Court to flesh out the contours of a developing right-has
the advantage of furthering predictability and stability in our state
law.8 2
so "Horizontal federalism, a federalism in which states look to each other for guidance,
may be the hallmark of the rest of the century." Pollock, State and Federal Courts, supra
note 6, at 992. State courts may find additional guidance in dissenting opinions of the
United States Supreme Court.
s' See Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 945, 948-49 (1964);
Brennan, Roles of Justice, supra note 68, at 8. See also Sager, Foreward: State Courts and
the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv.
959 (1985) (discussion of interplay between state and federal constitutional adjudication).
82 See State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 459 A.2d 641 (1983); People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d
234, 243, 500 N.E.2d 861, 866-67, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 168-69 (1986); People v. Elwell, 50
N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980). But see People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 488, 348 N.E.2d 894, 900-01, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 425 (1976) (discussing stare decisis in
constitutional law). As the New Jersey Supreme Court recently wrote in State v. Gilmore,
103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986), in concluding under the state constitution that defend-
ant's right to an impartial jury had been violated by the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges:
That the United States Supreme Court has overruled Swain in Batson does
not mean that the laboratories operated by leading state courts should now close
up shop. For one thing, Batson rests on federal grounds of equal protection,
whereas Wheeler and its progeny rest on state constitutional rights to trials by an
impartial jury. For another, Batson is not the final word in this area - as the
majority recognized, and as Justice White emphasized in concurrence, '[m]uch liti-
gation will be required to spell out the contours of the Court's Equal Protection
holding. .. .'
Accordingly, we base our decision on the New Jersey Constitution, which pro-
tects fundamental rights independently of the United States Constitution.
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In short, the development of an independent body of state
constitutional doctrine not only has deep historical roots but also
is theoretically sound.
V
We have so far been concerned with the conditions under
which state constitutional rights depend upon the delineation of
federal constitutional rights. I think it is only proper to turn the
tables and ask, are there conditions under which federal constitu-
tional rights should depend upon the delineation of state constitu-
tional rights?
Development of federal law through experimentation within
the states has a long tradition. Justice Brandeis, in his famous New
State Ice dissent,8 3 described as one of the "happy incidents" of
the federal system that a state, if its citizens chose, could serve as a
laboratory for novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.84 The Supreme Court implicitly recog-
nized this process in Mapp v. Ohio, 5 in giving the exclusionary
rule national application, noting that, since its own prior decision
declining to recognize the exclusionary rule as binding nationally,88
two-thirds of the states had themselves adopted the rule. 7 Only
last term, the Supreme Court reversed its prior ruling on the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges.8 8 A few years earlier, in
denying certiorari in a New York case, three Justices explicitly
Id. at 522, 511 A.2d at 1157 (citations omitted).
" New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
84 A similar process of recognizing constitutional rights - which are then beyond legis-
lative revision - may occur within state law. In In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981), the Court of Appeals recognized, as a
matter of common law, the right of a competent adult to control the course of his medical
treatment, and not to have his life prolonged by medical means; the court did not reach the
question whether this right is also guaranteed by the Constitution. Id. at 376-77, 420 N.E.2d
at 70-71, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73. The lower court, in In re Eichner (Fox), 73 App. Div. 2d
431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (2d Dep't 1980), had held that the right to refuse medical treatment
was guaranteed by the constitutional right to privacy. Id. at 461, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 536. In
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 493, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 78 (1986), the
Court of Appeals concluded that the fundamental common law right to refuse medical treat-
ment "is coextensive with the patient's liberty interest protected by the due process clause
of our State Constitution." Id.
85 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
" See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (fourth amendment binding on states,
but exclusionary rule is not).
'7 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
's Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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made known their interest in the issue, but said they preferred to
allow it to percolate further in the state laboratories, to generate
solutions upon which the Supreme Court might rely. 9 The growing
trend among the states ultimately led the Court to depart from its
holding in Swain v. Alabama,90 and also provided content for the
new rule.91
This practice comports with the theory outlined earlier.92 As
states may well have different constitutions from the national com-
munity, it logically follows that if a value is recognized by enough
such communities, then that value has come to be so recognized
by-and become part of the "constitution" of-the larger commu-
nity as well. In short, rights that come to be recognized as such by
enough of the People acting through the states may become federal
rights-values of national, constitutional importance.
Is there a place in our traditional constitutional structure for
such a result? I suggest that there is-the ninth amendment,
which reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people."9 3
The ninth amendment is perhaps the one sentence in the fed-
eral Constitution that has never been figured out. "In sophisticated
legal circles," John Hart Ely tells us, "mentioning the Ninth
Amendment is a surefire way to get a laugh. ('What are you plan-
ning to rely on to support that argument, Lester, the Ninth
'9 McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ.,
concurring).
'o 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
91 After it became apparent that the Swain rule had virtually no bite, two state courts,
California and Massachusetts, decided on the basis of their state constitutions to adopt a
stricter rule. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
Over the course of several years, the mechanics of the rule were fleshed out. See, e.g., People
v. Hall, 35 Cal. 3d 161, 672 P.2d 854, 197 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1983); Commonwealth v. Robinson,
382 Mass. 189, 415 N.E.2d 805 (1981). Other state courts followed suit. See Riley v. State,
496 A.2d 997 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481
(Fla. 1984); see also State v. Crespin, 94 N.M. 486, 612 P.2d 716 (Ct. App. 1980). The Su-
preme Court noted in Batson v. Kentucky that two federal courts of appeals had found
discriminating peremptory challenges violative of the federal Constitution by "[flollowing
the lead of a number of state courts construing their state's Constitution." Batson, 476 U.S.
at 82 n.1 (emphasis added). The Court's ruling itself basically adopted the California-Mas-
sachusetts procedure nationally.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
93 U.S. CONsT. amend. IX.
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Amendment?') ....,9 The ninth amendment has been dismissed
as stating a mere truism: that all powers not delegated by the Con-
stitution to the federal government remain undelegated as a result
of the Bill of Rights. But, as Dean Ely points out, the tenth
amendment, added to the Constitution at the same time as the
ninth, says this much more clearly. Thus, if the ninth amendment
is regarded as an unneeded truism, it also becomes a redundant
unneeded truism. As a commonplace of constitutional interpreta-
tion, however, "[ilt cannot be presumed that any clause in the con-
stitution is intended to be without effect .... ,9
In the case of the ninth amendment, then, what might that
intended effect be? The amendment's relatively few boosters have
been singularly unsuccessful at developing any content for it that
would do more than license the federal judiciary to define new
rights without providing any standards or mechanisms for so do-
ing. Yet as the text must have been intended to mean something,
the task must be to reason our way to some set of standards or
mechanisms that make sense of it. Reasoning through what it must
mean to say that the enumeration of rights in the original Bill of
Rights does not "deny or disparage" other rights retained by the
People, one might very well arrive at the point also reached from
the opposite direction: approaching state constitutional values as
the building blocks of federal constitutional values.98
It makes sense that rights protected by the federal Constitu-
tion should be expandable by the People acting through the states.
Under prevailing political theory, when the Constitution was
framed, particularly among the recalcitrant ratifiers at whose insis-
tence the Bill of Rights was added, it was fundamental
9 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34 (1980); see also
C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT (1955); Redlich, Ninth Amendment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CON-
sTrUTION 1316-20 (1986) [hereinafter Redlich, Ninth Amendment]; Redlich, Are There
"Certain Rights ... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787 (1962). The ninth
amendment has been mentioned in several Supreme Court cases enlarging the scope of indi-
vidual rights, although it has not yet served as the predicate for decision. See Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80 & n.15 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487-99
(Goldberg, J., concurring); cf. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511-20 (Stewart, J., dissenting). As Dean
Redlich has observed, persistent references to the ninth amendment suggest that it "could
serve as an analytical tool for the appraisal of new claims of constitutional rights." Redlich,
Ninth Amendment, supra, at 1319.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
"See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
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that the powers granted under the Constitution, being derived
from the people, may be resumed by them whenever perverted to
their injury; that every power not therein granted remains in the
people at their will; that no right of any denomination can be can-
celled, abridged, restrained or modified except in the instances
and for the purposes for which power is given; and that among
other essentials, liberty of the press and of conscience cannot be
abridged.9 7
As Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Marbury v. Madison,
"[tihat the people have an original right to establish, for their fu-
ture government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole
American fabric has been erected.""8
Whatever other rights may have been contemplated by the
framers of the ninth amendment, one of these "original" rights was
clearly the right to establish, and to alter, the principles of
government.
The conception that state-generated constitutional rights
could at some point become binding nationally gives the ninth
amendment substance without license. First, it allows for growth in
the federal Constitution slowly and through cautious experimenta-
tion, subject to testing and confirmation, and provides the People
the time and opportunity, acting through their state processes, to
reject, expand or modify rights declared at the state level before
they are taken as part of a national consensus. Second, this con-
ception of the ninth amendment gives the federal judiciary a point
of reference as to the overarching values embodied in our Constitu-
11 Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309, 314-15
(1936) (summarizing Virginia's reservations in ratifying Constitution). The theory of the
ninth amendment is, essentially, that "nothing has or can be lost by the people because
these rights exist independent of the limited powers granted to the federal government."
Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICK. L. REV. 121, 130 (1960). The problem
lies in identifying what these rights might be. One student of the ninth amendment found,
upon pursuing its legislative history, that the amendment's purpose was "to guarantee that
rights protected under state law would not be construed as supplanted by federal law
merely because they were not expressly listed in the Constitution." Caplan, The History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 254 (1983). The amendment, as
conceived of by its framers, "simply provides that the individual rights contained in state
law are to continue in force under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state
enactment, by federal preemption, or by a judicial determination of unconstitutionality." Id.
at 228. Thus, "[t]he retained rights envisioned by the framers ... included not only those
established by common law and statute as of the Constitution's adoption, but also those to
be subsequently established by state legislation." Id. at 248.
11 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-76.
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tion today, insuring that the Constitution grows to fit society, but
in a way more accessible to the democratic process and less depen-
dent on any individual judge's divination of "contemporary val-
ues." Finally, this view reinforces the role of the states as not only
guarantors but also generators of individual rights.
VI
In summary, state constitutional law is significant historically;
its independent development is sound today, both practically and
theoretically; and it represents an avenue for the future delineation
of constitutional rights nationally.

